This report describes a collaborative, multijurisdictional epidemiologic investigation using a cohort study and laboratory analyses to determine the source of infection and appropriate control measures. The results indicated that a combination of person-to-person and foodborne transmission of two strains of norovirus, likely introduced by persons from two different states and subsequently at least two food items, was the probable cause of these illnesses, highlighting the challenge of investigating and controlling norovirus outbreaks. During periods of peak norovirus activity, public health officials should emphasize the importance of appropriate handwashing and the exclusion of ill persons from social gatherings.
Epidemiologic Investigation
In collaboration with state and local health departments, interviews were conducted with 11 reunion attendees to help generate hypotheses and develop a list of attendees and foods served. A questionnaire was then developed to conduct a cohort study involving all reunion attendees. Questions addressed illness onset, symptoms, attendance at prereunion gatherings, consumption of specific food items, contact with ill persons, and onset of symptoms among nonattendees.
Questionnaires were administered by telephone and in person by state and local health department staff members from West Virginia and Maryland in coordination with health departments from the other attendee jurisdictions in Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.
An attendee case was defined as two or more episodes of nonbloody diarrhea (i.e., two or more loose stools in a 24-hour period) or vomiting within a single 24-hour period on or after October 7, 2006 , in a person who attended the reunion. A nonattendee case was defined as acute illness characterized by vomiting or diarrhea with onset after 12 a.m. on October 18 in persons who did not attend the reunion but who had direct contact (i.e., within 3 feet) with attendees after the reunion.
The list of reunion attendees included 53 persons, of whom 48 (91%) were interviewed. Of those interviewed, 28 (58%) had illness that met the attendee case definition. In addition, four cases were identified among nonattendees, all of whom were household contacts of attendees. Symptoms reported by the 28 ill attendees included diarrhea (96%), vomiting (75%), abdominal cramps (71%), nausea (61%), headache (54%), chills (36%), body aches (32%), fever (not specified) (21%), and fatigue or malaise (18%). Nineteen (68%) of the 28 ill attendees were female, and six (21%) were aged <10 years. Six (21%) of the patients sought medical care. For the 25 patients who reported both date of illness onset and date of recovery, the median duration of illness was 54 hours (range: 6-135 hours). Twenty-one of the 28 attendee cases occurred during October 14-16 ( Figure) .
The 1-day reunion began at 11 a.m. on October 14. Persons with illness onset after 8 p.m. on October 14 through 12 a.m. on October 18 were included in the cohort study, as were persons who attended but did not become ill ( Figure) . Persons with illness onset either before the reunion or after 12 a.m. on October 18 were excluded. Incubation periods were calculated by subtracting the date and time of the first possible exposure from the date and time of illness onset. The first possible exposure was defined as either the time the person arrived at the reunion or the time the person arrived at a prereunion gathering where previously ill persons were present. Nine of the 48 interviewed attendees were excluded from the cohort study because they did not meet the defined illnessonset criteria. Three had illness onset >72 hours after the reunion. Six attendees had illness onset either before the reunion or within 6 hours after the reunion began and might have introduced the illness into the reunion; four of these six were immediate family members from New York who had traveled to the reunion together, including a child who was ill with vomiting and diarrhea during the reunion, and the other two were West Virginia residents who had no contact with each other or the family from New York immediately before the reunion.
Of the 39 attendees included in the cohort study, 19 met the case definition and illness-onset criteria, and 20 did not become ill. The median incubation period for the 19 cases was 36 hours (range: 20-61 hours). Of 31 food items served at the reunion (Table 1) , two items were identified as significant risk factors for developing illness (p<0.05, by two-tailed Mantel-Haenszel chi-square test) and were eaten by the majority of ill persons: scalloped potatoes (relative risk [RR] = 2.8, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.1-6.9) and chicken (RR = 2.2, CI = 1.0-4.8). Both food items were eaten at the reunion by persons who were ill before the reunion, which might have provided an opportunity for these persons to contaminate the food at the event. The chicken was purchased at a store by the family from New York, whose four members had been ill before the reunion, which provided another opportunity for the food to be contaminated. The scalloped potatoes were brought by persons from West Virginia who were not ill before the reunion. Consumption of the chocolate cheese ball also was statistically associated with illness (p = 0.04), but the item was only eaten by seven persons. In addition, six of the seven attendees who ate the chocolate cheese ball also ate both the chicken and scalloped potatoes; all seven ate the chicken. Self-reported direct contact with ill persons at the reunion, including with the symptomatic child, also * Three of the four New York family members who were ill before the reunion submitted stool samples; neither of the two persons from West Virginia who were ill submitted a stool sample. The specimen from one West Virginia resident was analyzed at the Maryland state laboratory because of assay availability. enced symptoms of disease (5) . The primary route of transmission for noroviruses is fecal-oral, including consumption of fecally contaminated food or water, direct person-toperson contact, and contaminated objects or environments (4, 5) . Airborne transmission via vomitus droplets also can occur (4, 5) . During outbreaks, primary cases often result from exposure to a fecally contaminated food item, object, or environment, whereas secondary cases result from person-toperson transmission (6) . Noroviruses and norovirus infections have numerous characteristics that facilitate their spread during outbreaks, including the low dose required for infection; prolonged, asymptomatic shedding that can occur in infected persons; environmental stability of the virus; and lack of lasting immunity in persons who have been infected previously (4). Molecular epidemiologic techniques have identified substantial strain diversity, and epidemic strains of norovirus might be more virulent or more environmentally persistent than nonepidemic strains (7) . This outbreak highlights the challenges of investigating and controlling norovirus outbreaks, including multiple modes of transmission. The findings of this investigation, including the detection of two different norovirus strains in patients, suggest that illness was independently introduced into the reunion by several sources (i.e., persons from New York and from West Virginia). Food items might have been contaminated by persons who were ill when they attended the reunion. Infection likely was propagated through a combination of person-to person contact and foodborne transmission; transmission through contaminated fomites cannot be ruled out. Laboratory evidence confirmed that at least two different norovirus strains were circulating among attendees. The convergence of two virus strains in a single outbreak coincided with a period of high norovirus activity in the region. During October-December 2006, a total of 20 other outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis in West Virginia were reported to WVDHHR, representing a sevenfold increase in the number reported during the same period in 2005.
Prevention and control of norovirus outbreaks, especially during periods of increased norovirus circulation, should emphasize standard infection-control practices, including the exclusion of ill caregivers and food handlers from work settings and exercising adequate hand hygiene (8) . Persons who have had gastroenteritis recently should pay attention to washing their hands after toileting and should not prepare food. Food items that might have been contaminated by persons with gastroenteritis should be discarded. As demonstrated by this outbreak, collaboration among multiple state and local health departments often is required for prompt public health investigations of norovirus outbreaks, which can be complicated by multiple sources, viral strains, and routes of this highly transmissible infection.
Hepatitis A Vaccination Coverage Among Children Aged 24-35 MonthsUnited States, 2004-2005
After the licensure of hepatitis A vaccine in 1995 for children aged >24 months, the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) incrementally expanded the proportion of children for whom it recommended the vaccine. In 1996, ACIP recommended vaccinating children in communities that had high rates of hepatitis A virus (HAV) infection, including American Indian/Alaska Native (AI/AN) communities and selected Hispanic and religious communities (1) . In 1999, ACIP extended the recommendation to include routine vaccination for all children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates twice the 1987-1997 national average of 10 cases per 100,000 population (i.e., >20 cases per 100,000 population); ACIP also recommended considering vaccination for children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates exceeding the 1987-1997 national average (i.e., >10 to <20 cases per 100,000 population) (2) In states where vaccination was recommended or to be considered, non-Hispanic blacks, Hispanics, AI/ANs, and Asians/Pacific Islanders (A/PIs) had greater vaccination coverage rates than non-Hispanic whites (Figure 2 (4) .
Despite low levels of 1-dose hepatitis A vaccination coverage compared with other recommended vaccinations, the number of cases and rates of acute hepatitis A in the United States have declined substantially, especially among racial/ ethnic groups disproportionately affected by hepatitis A. Before the 1995 introduction of hepatitis A vaccine for children aged >24 months, rates of acute hepatitis A were five times greater than the national average among AI/ANs and three times greater among Hispanics (1). In 2005, acute hepatitis A rates among AI/ANs were comparable to other populations but remained greater for Hispanics compared with non-Hispanics (9). This trend demonstrates progress toward eliminating racial/ethnic disparities previously observed in rates of acute hepatitis A.
The overall number of cases and rates of acute hepatitis A in the United States have declined to historic lows since the last peak in 1995. In 1995, a total of 31,582 cases were reported (12 per 100,000 population), compared with 4,488 cases (1.5 per 100,000) in 2005, which was the lowest annual number ever recorded (5). In 2005, similar rates of acute hepatitis A were reported by states where vaccination was recommended (2.1 per 100,000), states where vaccination was to be considered (1.5 per 100,000), and states where no specific recommendation for vaccination was in effect (1.3 per 100,000) (CDC, unpublished data, 2005). Even limited vaccination coverage might reduce disease incidence through herd effects because young children are thought to be a major reservoir of infection. In one communitywide outbreak, approximately 40% of adults with hepatitis A without an identifiable source lived with a child aged <6 years who had evidence of recent HAV infection (10) . Declines also might be the result of cyclic increases and decreases in HAV infections (9) . living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates twice the 1987-1997 national average of 10 cases per 100,000 population (i.e., >20 cases per 100,000 population); ACIP also recommended considering vaccination for children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates exceeding the 1987-1997 national average (i.e., >10 to <20 cases per 100,000 population). † In 1996, ACIP recommended vaccinating children in communities that had high rates of hepatitis A virus infection, including American Indian/Alaska Native communities and selected Hispanic and religious communities. In 1999, ACIP extended the recommendation to include routine vaccination for all children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates twice the 1987-1997 national average of 10 cases per 100,000 population (i.e., >20 cases per 100,000 population); ACIP also recommended considering vaccination for children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates exceeding the 1987-1997 national average (i.e., >10 to <20 cases per 100,000 population The data in this report do not explain differences in coverage levels among states; however, variations in state mandates for vaccination might provide one explanation for these differences. Statewide day care or school-entry mandates were in effect in six of the 11 states where vaccination was recommended. Intrastate regional mandates were in effect in one of six states where vaccination was to be considered and in one of 33 states where no specific recommendation for vaccination was in effect.* In August 2005, hepatitis A vaccine was licensed by the Food and Drug Administration for use in younger children (aged >12 months). In 2006, ACIP recommended routine vaccination of all children aged >12 months regardless of risk category or geographic location (6) . This recommendation should decrease hepatitis A incidence in states where vaccination was not recommended previously and should sustain reductions in places where hepatitis A vaccination has been recommended since 1999. infection, including American Indian/Alaska Native communities and selected Hispanic and religious communities. In 1999, ACIP extended the recommendation to include routine vaccination for all children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates twice the 1987-1997 national average of 10 cases per 100,000 population (i.e., >20 cases per 100,000 population); ACIP also recommended considering vaccination for children living in states, counties, and communities with incidence rates exceeding the 1987-1997 national average (i.e., >10 to <20 cases per 100,000 population). † 95% confidence interval. (1) (2) (3) (4) . Continuing challenges included intense WPV circulation in northern India during 2006, low vaccination coverage with oral polio vaccine (OPV) during supplemental immunization activities (SIAs)* in Nigeria, and security problems preventing access to children during SIAs along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Programmatic strategies to address these challenges consisted of large-scale use of type 1 monovalent oral polio vaccine (mOPV1) (5), targeted programs (e.g., cross-border synchronization of polio campaigns) to reach more children through SIAs, and introduction of new laboratory procedures to confirm cases more rapidly. This report summarizes these strategies and overall progress toward global polio eradication.
Routine OPV Vaccination
Routine vaccination remains an integral component of the polio eradication initiative. Global routine vaccination coverage for infants with 3 doses of OPV was estimated at 78% † in 2005, the most recent year with fully reported data, and was similar to the 3-dose OPV coverage reported in 2004 (81%). Estimated routine coverage varied among World Health Organization (WHO) regions in 2005: 63% in the SouthEast Asian, 69% in the African, 84% in the Eastern Mediterranean, 87% in the Western Pacific, and >90% in the European and Americas regions. In the four polio-endemic countries, 3-dose OPV coverage was estimated at 77% in Pakistan, 76% in Afghanistan, 58% in India, and 39% in Nigeria; however, lower coverage has been reported in areas with ongoing polio transmission (e.g., northern Nigeria and the northern Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar).
SIAs in 2006
In To improve SIA quality, new approaches were used in the four polio-endemic countries in 2006. In mid-2006, Nigeria initiated a strategy of offering other vaccines (i.e., measles and diphtheria and tetanus toxoids and pertussis vaccine) and health interventions (i.e., bednets and deworming medication) in addition to OPV during SIAs, which were renamed "immunization-plus days" (2) . The proportion of "zero-dose" children § in northern states decreased from approximately 50% at the end of 2005 to an average of 20% by the end of 2006. In India, in response to an outbreak in 2006, the National Polio Program increased the number of large-scale SIAs in districts with the highest polio risk (western Uttar Pradesh and Bihar), using mainly mOPV1 and concentrating on improving coverage among children aged <2 years. To reach migrating families, Afghanistan implemented a new multipronged approach that included cross-border synchronization of polio campaigns with Pakistan.
Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) Surveillance
The quality of AFP surveillance is monitored by three performance indicators: 1) the rate of AFP cases not caused by WPV (i.e., the nonpolio AFP rate; target for certification: more than one case per 100,000 persons aged <15 years); 2) the proportion of AFP cases with adequate stool specimens ¶ (target for certification: >80%), and 3) the proportion of stool specimens processed in a WHO-accredited laboratory (target: 100%). In 2006, each WHO region maintained sensitivity of AFP surveillance to detect paralytic polio cases at certification-standard levels (Table) with OPV, according to their vaccination histories. ¶ Two specimens are collected >24 hours apart, both within 14 days of paralysis onset, and shipped on ice or frozen ice packs to a WHO-accredited laboratory, arriving at the laboratory in good condition. minimum operational target nonpolio AFP rate of two cases per 100,000 persons aged <15 years for all polio-endemic countries and countries at high risk for WPV importation (6) . All four polio-endemic countries and 12 of the 13 (i.e., all except Kenya) countries in which polio was reintroduced in 2006 reached this new operational nonpolio AFP target rate in 2006.
Global Polio Laboratory Network
In 2006, WHO fully accredited 97% of the 145 global poliovirus network laboratories, which together analyzed approximately 135,000 fecal samples. In late 2006, the laboratory network evaluated and began adoption of a new testing strategy that will reduce poliovirus confirmation time by 50%, from 42 days to 21 days. The new approach uses previously available technologies for poliovirus identification in a new testing sequence that generates results more rapidly.** The network has established a goal to increase to >75% (compared with 58% to date in 2007) the percentage of fecal samples tested from polio-endemic regions in laboratories with capacity for both virus isolation in cell culture and intratypic differentiation (i.e., identification of viruses as either wild or vaccine like) by mid-2008.
WPV Incidence
As Editorial Note: The global incidence of polio was unchanged from 2005 to 2006. Although the number of polio cases from importations decreased, the number of cases in the four polioendemic countries increased from 2005 to 2006 because of low SIA coverage in Nigeria, intense virus circulation in certain high-risk districts in northern India, and security-related access problems in Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas. However, programmatic strategies developed to address these challenges, including use of mOPV1 with its greater efficacy against WPV1 compared with trivalent OPV (5), have had an impact on polio transmission in the four polio-endemic countries, as suggested by the decrease in the number of WPV1 cases in early 2007.
In Nigeria, implementation of immunization-plus days reduced the proportion of zero-dose children by roughly 30%, indicating that more children are being reached and vaccinated for the first time. India responded to a WPV1 outbreak by increasing the number of large-scale SIAs in the highestrisk districts of western Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, using mainly mOPV1, and concentrating on improving the coverage among children aged <2 years. Polio program staff members in Afghanistan and Pakistan implemented synchronized crossborder polio campaigns, ensuring simultaneous and comprehensive coverage of children in transit through the border areas. Although these strategies have positively affected polio transmission in high-risk countries, ongoing program evaluation and adaptability to changing circumstances will be crucial for progress to continue during the remainder of 2007 and early 2008.
In February 2007, a meeting was held at WHO headquarters in Geneva, attended by envoys of the heads of state of the four polio-endemic countries and by major polio-eradication partners. Agreement was reached regarding the technical feasibility of polio eradication and the economic benefits of eradication compared with a polio-control program. The national technical advisory bodies of the polio-endemic countries subsequently convened in May and early June 2007 to review the latest epidemiologic and programmatic data and to further refine tactics to vaccinate all children with OPV during the second half of 2007. WPV1 transmission has been curtailed substantially in the polio-endemic countries. With global collaboration and sustained commitment, the world can achieve global polio eradication.
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Notice to Readers
Malaria Rapid Diagnostic Test
On June 13, 2007, the Food and Drug Administration approved BinaxNOW ® Malaria (Inverness Medical Professional Diagnostics, Scarborough, Maine), the first malaria rapid diagnostic test (RDT) authorized for use in the United States. Malaria RDTs, which detect circulating malaria-specific antigens, already are available in other countries and often are used in settings where malaria microscopy is not available. In the United States, use of the RDT can decrease the amount of time required to determine whether a patient is infected with malaria.
BinaxNOW ® Malaria is approved for use by hospital and commercial laboratories, not by individual clinicians or by patients themselves; however, the manufacturer is planning to seek a Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments waiver for point-of-care use by clinicians. The RDT detects two different malaria antigens: HRP2, which is specific to Plasmodium falciparum, and a malaria aldolase found in all four human species of malaria parasites. Although the test can identify P. falciparum, it cannot distinguish between Plasmodium vivax, Plasmodium ovale, or Plasmodium malariae or detect mixed infections. The manufacturer recommends that the laboratory maintain a supply of blood containing P. falciparum for use as a positive control (1) .
Use of a malaria RDT does not eliminate the need to examine thick and thin blood smears for the presence of malaria parasites. The RDT might not be able to detect infections with lower concentrations of malaria parasites, and data are insufficient to determine the ability of this test to detect the two less common species of malaria parasite, P. ovale and P. malariae. Therefore, all negative RDT results should be followed by microscopy to confirm the results and accurately identify the species.
Although malaria treatment should be initiated after receipt of positive RDT results, these results also should be followed by microscopy. In cases of nonfalciparum malaria, microscopy is needed to determine the species of malaria parasite. In addition, because the result of the RDT is qualitative and not quantitative, it cannot be used to determine initial parasite density or the parasitologic response to therapy. Therefore, serial microscopy is needed to quantify the proportion of red blood cells that are infected, an important prognostic indicator that can be used to monitor response to therapy.
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